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Abstract: The main bone of contention between A. Huxley and G. Orwell is easy to identify : 
could or should political power be benevolent. In order to provide a sound answer, three steps 
are expedient. First, the political contrast drawing a sharp line between Huxley and Orwell is 
specified. Second, this contrast is shown to be correlated with Huxley’s technophilia, as it is the 
heir of La Boétie and Tocqueville, and with Orwell’s technophobia, mainly summoned by the 
harsh reality of fascist totalitarianism. Third, we evoke the limited way in which Huxley can be 
said to have changed, in the sixties, his understanding of the relevance of his own dystopia.  
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0. INTRODUCTION 
Of all Aldous Huxley’s (1894–1963) contemporaries, George Orwell (1903–1950) 
is arguably the most important fellow essayist—but he is also the one with 
whom there has been probably the least intellectual kinship. Huxley has indeed 
made it plain that he never understood Orwell's main intuition: according to 
the latter, “priests of power” cannot be satisfied with “dictatorship without 
tears.”  
Most of Huxley’s works are spread between Brave New World (1932) and 
Island (1962). In both books, technoscience constitutes the main background of 
the narrative, but with quite different outcomes. In Brave New World’s dystopia, 
it is the mysterium tremendum et fascinans that totally enslaves humans for their own 
good. In Island’s utopia, it constitutes—with Tantric Buddhism—the very 
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backbone of community life. Both narratives are organized around similar 
patterns involving a strong enthusiasm for technologies and techniques lato 
sensu, such as eugenics, hypnosis, birth-control and the use of psychotropic 
substances. 
Orwell, for his part, finds only alienation in technoscience. In Nineteen 
Eighty-Four (1949), it is used to discipline and punish through military 
Keynesianism, panoptic surveillance, and scientific electro-torture.  
The specification of the main bone of contention—could or should political 
power be benevolent—will allow us to comprehend better Huxley’s and 
Orwell’s respective worldviews. The argument unfolds as follows: first the 
political contrast drawing a sharp line between Huxley and Orwell is specified. 
Second, this contrast is shown to be correlated with Huxley’s technophilia, as it 
is the heir of La Boétie and Tocqueville, and with Orwell’s technophobia, 
mainly summoned by the harsh reality of fascist totalitarianism. Third, we 
evoke the limited way in which Huxley can be said to have changed, in the 
sixties, his understanding of the relevance of his own dystopia.  
1. THE POLITICAL CONTRAST 
The fundamental contrast between Huxley and Orwell is—unsurprisingly—
political. It boils down to the difference that exists between benevolent and 
malevolent political power, i.e., between power exercised for the common good 
and power exercised for the pathological enjoyment of the ruler(s).1 This thesis 
is very easy to establish straightforwardly; it suffices to compare the key 
episodes of Brave New World and Nineteen Eighty-Four: on the one hand, the 
dialogue that takes place between Mustapha Mond and John the Savage makes 
obvious that the World State is ruling (or at least pretends to rule) for the good 
of its citizens (or at least claims to do so);2 on the other hand, the solemn torture 
session of Winston deals with the question why: why should the Ministry of 
Love “expend so much time and trouble” on him? O’Brien states explicitly on 
 
1 This contrast is akin to Aristotle’s criterion structuring the typology of his Politics (III, vii ; cf. IV, ii & 
passim): who exercises power and for whom? 
2 Aldous Huxley, Brave New World [1932], With an introduction by David Bradshaw, Hammersmith, 
HarperCollins, 1994, antepenultimate chapter XVI. 
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that occasion that “the Party seeks power entirely for its own sake.”3 
It sounds as if Orwell was precisely answering the question that bothered 
John the Savage… Let us go through the details because it is difficult to 
overemphasize the importance of this dark contrast. 
1.1. Huxley 
The dialogue between Mond and John constitutes a dispassionate plea for the 
World State’s engineered stability: 
The world's stable now. People are happy; they get what they want, and they 
never want what they can't get. They're well off; they're safe; they're never ill; 
they're not afraid of death; they're blissfully ignorant of passion and old age; 
they're plagued with no mothers or fathers; they've got no wives, or children, or 
lovers to feel strongly about; they're so conditioned that they practically can't help 
behaving as they ought to behave. And if anything should go wrong, there's 
soma. (pp. 200-201) 
In other words, conformal identity and fusional community are not to be 
thought of as major drawbacks or as impediments to happiness—on the 
contrary, they grant it:  
We believe in happiness and stability. A society of Alphas couldn't fail to be 
unstable and miserable. Imagine a factory staffed by Alphas—that is to say by 
separate and unrelated individuals of good heredity and conditioned so as to be 
capable (within limits) of making a free choice and assuming responsibilities. 
Imagine it! […] The Cyprus experiment was convincing. (pp. 202-203) 
A truly civilized society cannot afford old-fashioned citizens (in the Greek 
democratic sense of the term) anymore. Even science has to be bridled for the 
sake of stability: 
“Sometimes,” he added, “I rather regret the science. Happiness is a hard 
master—particularly other people's happiness. A much harder master, if one isn't 
conditioned to accept it unquestioningly, than truth.” He sighed, fell silent again, 
then continued in a brisker tone, “Well, duty's duty. One can't consult one's own 
preference. I'm interested in truth, I like science. But truth's a menace, science is 
 
3 George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four [1949], Introduction by Thomas Pynchon, London, Penguin Books, 
(also ed. Pinguin 1954), 2003, p. 301. 
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a public danger. […].”4 
We thus obtain the best possible world under the guise of a perfect 
clockwork society.5 
1.2. Orwell 
Stability is also the ideal cultivated by the Inner Party. The means are however 
quite different and the ethos of the “elite” is even more so. O’Brien speaks: 
“And now let us get back to the question of "how" and "why". You understand 
well enough how the Party maintains itself in power. Now tell me why we cling to 
power. What is our motive? Why should we want power? Go on, speak,” he 
added as Winston remained silent. 
Nevertheless Winston did not speak for another moment or two. A feeling of 
weariness had overwhelmed him. The faint, mad gleam of enthusiasm had come 
back into O'Brien's face. He knew in advance what O'Brien would say. That the 
Party did not seek power for its own ends, but only for the good of the majority. 
That it sought power because men in the mass were frail, cowardly creatures who 
could not endure liberty or face the truth, and must be ruled over and 
systematically deceived by others who were stronger than themselves. That the 
choice for mankind lay between freedom and happiness, and that, for the great 
bulk of mankind, happiness was better. That the party was the eternal guardian 
of the weak, a dedicated sect doing evil that good might come, sacrificing its own 
happiness to that of others. […] “You are ruling over us for our own good,” he 
said feebly. “You believe that human beings are not fit to govern themselves, and 
therefore—” 
He started and almost cried out. A pang of pain had shot through his body. 
O'Brien had pushed the lever of the dial up to thirty-five. 
“That was stupid, Winston, stupid!” he said. “You should know better than to say 
a thing like that.” 
He pulled the lever back and continued: “Now I will tell you the answer to my 
 
4 Aldous Huxley, Brave New World, p. 207. Mond continues: “Our Ford himself did a great deal to shift the 
emphasis from truth and beauty to comfort and happiness. Mass production demanded the shift. 
Universal happiness keeps the wheels steadily turning; truth and beauty can't.” (p. 208) “That's how I 
paid. By choosing to serve happiness. Other people's—not mine.” (p. 209) 
5 “Société-horloge” vs thermodynamical societies (“société-vapeur”)—Georges Charbonnier, Entretiens avec 
Claude Lévi-Strauss [1959], Paris, Éditions Julliard et Librairie Plon, 1961. To speak of a “clockwork” society 
can either be derogatory or complimentary. When Lévi-Strauss speaks enthusiastically of the archaic 
communities as being truly democratic, he obviously embraces the latter meaning. 
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question. It is this. The Party seeks power entirely for its own sake. We are not 
interested in the good of others; we are interested solely in power. Not wealth or 
luxury or long life or happiness: only power, pure power. What pure power 
means you will understand presently. We are different from all the oligarchies of 
the past, in that we know what we are doing. All the others, even those who 
resembled ourselves, were cowards and hypocrites. The German Nazis and the 
Russian Communists came very close to us in their methods, but they never had 
the courage to recognize their own motives. They pretended, perhaps they even 
believed, that they had seized power unwillingly and for a limited time, and that 
just round the corner there lay a paradise where human beings would be free and 
equal. We are not like that. We know that no one ever seizes power with the 
intention of relinquishing it. Power is not a means, it is an end. One does not 
establish a dictatorship in order to safeguard a revolution; one makes the 
revolution in order to establish the dictatorship. The object of persecution is 
persecution. The object of torture is torture. The object of power is power. Now 
do you begin to understand me?”6 
This quote is self-explanatory. Power is sought for itself—full stop. The 
consequences are delineated infra; for the time being, let us underline that such 
“politics” necessarily involves pain, humiliation and suffering: “a world of fear, 
treachery, torment.”7 In order to interpret this fundamental contrast with 
Huxley, it is wise to question the correlation that exists between technique and 
totalitarianism.  
2. TECHNIQUE AND TOTALITARIANISM 
In Huxley’s and Orwell’s works, the fundamental contrast between benevolent 
and malevolent power presupposes a strict correlation between technique and 
totalitarianism. Let us first define these terms. Whitehead has claimed that we 
should seek simplicity and distrust it; this is indeed the unavoidable burden of 
any scholarly discussion.8 
The Ellulian concept of technique explicates to a great extent Gheorghiu’s 
dramatic depiction of concentration camps under Nazi, American and Soviet 
occupations of Central Europe. Technique could be defined in the following 
 
6 George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four, pp. 300-302 
7 George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four, p. 306 
8 “Seek simplicity and distrust it.” The Concept of Nature [1920], Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1964, p. 163. 
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way: the systematic use of general categories to obtain maximum efficiency 
when dealing with events in some field of human activity, or with individual 
human beings themselves.9 This is typically of course what science does when it 
seeks to understand the world and how consequently technology grounds its 
efficacy. 
Totalitarianism is the political system that imposes the single authority of 
the State over all aspects of public and private life. This is achieved through 
technique: individual human beings are seen, and, so to speak, taken care of, 
through a screen that defines them as members of one or more given classes. 
Human beings are not considered in themselves, as unique individuals 
endowed with absolute value, but as a mere accidental bundle of data.  
In sum, from the perspective of Ellul, technique and totalitarianism go hand 
in hand. That correlation between technique and totalitarianism actually 
involves two complementary arguments. On the one hand, since technique 
relies upon the categorization of individuals and ignores everything that cannot 
be categorized according to its own standards, it necessarily negates what 
makes them unique. Technique being intrinsically totalitarian, it pushes history 
in that direction: it does not only make totalitarianism possible, it makes it 
inevitable. On the other, totalitarianism cannot implement its agenda without 
the extensive use of appropriate techniques. 
How are these processes embedded in, respectively, Huxley and Orwell? 
Some reference to the history of ideas will be handy to unravel their respective 
conceptual threads.  
2.1. Huxley’s technophilia 
Huxley’s correlation is anchored in the well-known arguments of La Boétie and 
Tocqueville. On the one hand, the creation of the best possible world requires 
the use of conformation techniques. On the other hand, the recent scientific 
advances are pushing politics towards a new form of totalitarianism. In other 
words, Brave New World lies at the junction of a top-down and a bottom-up 
process. 
 
9 Jacques Ellul, Le système technicien, Paris, Éditions Calmann-Lévy, 1977. Constantin Virgil Gheorghiu, The 
twenty-fifth hour [1949], Translated from the Romanian by Rita Eldon, New York, Alfred A Knopf, 1950. 
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2.1.1. La Boétie 
The import of La Boétie’s Discourse of  Voluntary Servitude (1574) is well-known: if 
tyrants want to establish their power, it is far more efficient to use opinion than 
force. Obedience, in other words, can be guaranteed if you enslave people’s 
minds. Why would you regret liberty if you have never known it? Or, as Orwell 
would put it, if there is even no word to name it anymore? “The essential 
reason why men take orders willingly is that they are born serfs and are reared 
as such.”10  
The use and abuse of opinion is of course not a new theme in Western 
philosophy, as Plato’s corpus amply shows. In his Tractatus theologico-politicus 
(1677), Spinoza forcibly labours the exact same point,11 as does Hume’s “Of the 
First Principles of Government” (1741).12 So Huxley is in good company when 
he emphasizes that 
There is, of course, no reason why the new totalitarianisms should resemble the 
old. Government by clubs and firing squads, by artificial famine, mass 
imprisonment and mass deportation, is not merely inhumane (nobody cares 
much about that nowadays); it is demonstrably inefficient—and in an age of 
advanced technology, inefficiency is the sin against the Holy Ghost. A really 
efficient totalitarian state would be one in which the all-powerful executive of 
political bosses and their army of managers control a population of slaves who do 
not have to be coerced, because they love their servitude. To make them love it is 
the task assigned, in present-day totalitarian states, to ministries of propaganda, 
 
10 “On ne regrette jamais ce que l’on a jamais eu. […] La première raison pour laquelle les hommes 
servent volontairement, c’est qu’ils naissent serfs et qu’ils sont élevés comme tels.” (Étienne de La Boétie, 
Discours de la servitude volontaire [1574]. Traduction en français moderne et postface de Séverine Auffret, Paris, Éditions 
Mille et une nuits, 1995, pp. 17-19; I quote Harry Kurz’s translation, p. 62) 
11 “The supreme mystery of despotism, its prop and stay, is to keep men in a state of deception, and with 
the specious title of religion to cloak the fear by which they must be held in check, so that they will fight 
for their servitude as if for salvation […].” (Spinoza, Tractatus theologico-politicus, Tr. by Samuel Shirley, p. 
389) 
12 “Nothing appears more surprizing to those, who consider human affairs with a philosophical eye, than 
the easiness with which the many are governed by the few; and the implicit submission, with which men 
resign their own sentiments and passions to those of their rulers. When we enquire by what means this 
wonder is effected, we shall find, that, as Force is always on the side of the governed, the governors have 
nothing to support them but opinion. It is therefore, on opinion only that government is founded; and this 
maxim extends to the most despotic and most military governments, as well as to the most free and most 
popular. The sultan of Egypt, or the emperor of Rome, might drive his harmless subjects, like brute 
beasts, against their sentiments and inclination: But he must, at least, have led his mamalukes, or praetorian 
bands, like men, by their opinion.” (David Hume, “Of the First Principles of Government,” Essay V of 
Essays, Moral and Political, Edinburgh, 1741) 
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newspaper editor and schoolteachers. But their methods are still crude and 
unscientific.13 
In sum, La Boétie offers the astrolabe (or final cause) of Huxleyan politics: 
to give rise to and nurture people’s love of their own servitude. But what about 
the plummet (or efficient cause)?14  
2.1.2. Tocqueville 
Three authors deserve to be named to circumscribe the required efficiency. Ab 
Jove principium, Tocqueville sets the tone of the discussion in his De la démocratie en 
Amérique (1835 & 1840). The thesis is simple: a democracy where conformism 
and atomism are structurally ingrained is likely to degenerate into a “friendly 
fascism” of sorts.15 Please notice that his argument runs in the opposite 
direction as La Boétie’s: we do not deal with a policy that moulds the social 
tissue but with the corruption of the tissue itself. Ellul has also insisted on this, 
basically following the lead of Francis Bacon’s Nova Atlantis (1624): everything 
that is technically feasible will be actualized and the social tissue will be 
modified accordingly. 
Now, Tocqueville defines the form of the argument but not its content. 
Huxley is here mainly relying upon two contemporary scientists: J. B. S. 
 
13 Aldous Huxley, “Foreword” [1946] in Brave New World, 1932. Interestingly enough, Orwell teases the 
same idea at one point: “By comparison with that existing today, all the tyrannies of the past were half-
hearted and inefficient. The ruling groups were always infected to some extent by liberal ideas, and were 
content to leave loose ends everywhere, to regard only the overt act and to be uninterested in what their 
subjects were thinking. Even the Catholic Church of the Middle Ages was tolerant by modern standards. 
Part of the reason for this was that in the past no government had the power to keep its citizens under 
constant surveillance. The invention of print, however, made it easier to manipulate public opinion, and 
the film and the radio carried the process further. With the development of television, and the technical 
advance which made it possible to receive and transmit simultaneously on the same instrument 
[telescreen], private life came to an end. Every citizen, or at least every citizen important enough to be 
worth watching, could be kept for twenty-four hours a day under the eyes of the police and in the sound 
of official propaganda, with all other channels of communication closed. The possibility of enforcing not 
only complete obedience to the will of the State, but complete uniformity of opinion on all subjects, now 
existed for the first time.” (George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four, p. 235) 
14 “Love is the plummet as well as the astrolabe of God’s mysteries”; “[…] the teleological pull from in 
front. This teleological pull is a pull from the divine Ground of things.” (Aldous Huxley, The Perennial 
Philosophy, London, Chatto & Windus, 1947, pp. 274 et 276) 
15 Tocqueville actually speaks of “servitude” (p. 656), “asservissement”, “barbarie”, “despotisme doux” (p. 
646). “Friendly fascism” is Bertram Gross’s expression: cf. his Friendly Fascism: the New Face of Power in 
America (New-York, M. Evans & Co., 1980)—that curiously does not quote Tocqueville. 
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Haldane and his own brother Julian.16 It is in their works that we find Huxley’s 
chief intuition: techno-science will inevitably transform the cultures (not simply 
the modalities of social intercourse) in which they dwell. The tone and content 
of Brave New World’s narrative clearly bears the mark of the biological science of 
his time. Eugenics is a constant theme in Huxley. 
In a nutshell: in Brave New World, La Boétie’s intuition is filled with the 
trends in contemporary biological science. 
2.2. Orwell’s technophobia 
The same pattern is at work in Orwell—Nineteen Eighty-Four also lies at the 
junction of a top-down and a bottom-up process—, but the result he obtains is 
completely different. For one thing, La Boétie is irrelevant: people are not 
meant to ignore their total servitude. For another, the technical possibilities are 
almost trivial: what really matters is the toxic climate they create and the crux 
of Orwell’s argument—the scientific use of electro-torture—does not require the 
sophisticated apparatus  sketched (sometimes clumsily) by Huxley. 
Orwell’s correlation between technique and totalitarianism is bluntly 
anchored in the post-war descriptions of totalitarianism: his reading of Eugene 
Zamyatin17 and his understanding of Stalinism and of the impact of Nazi 
concentration camp policies on power games.18 The political vision per se was 
his own.  
2.2.1. Nineteen Eighty-Four 
Huxley’s vision sprang from a LaBoétian argument of sorts and was made 
operative by a scientific form of Tocqueville’s striking anticipation. Orwell’s 
vision is peculiar to him (with Zamyatin as a probable catalyst) and was, in all 
likelihood, nourished by the accounts and reflections of camp survivors. Power 
 
16 John Burdon Sanderson Haldane, Daedalus or Science and the Future [A paper read to the heretics, 
Cambridge, on February 4th, 1923]. 3rd impr., London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1924; Sir Julian 
Huxley, What Dare I Think? The Challenge of Modern Science to Human Action and Belief. Including the Henry 
LaBarre Jayne Foundation Lectures (Philadelphia) for 1931, London, Chatto & Windus & Harper, 1931. 
17 Eugene Zamyatin, We: A Novel [1920], New York, E. P. Dutton, 1924 
18 John Newsinger claims that “while [Orwell] certainly knew about and wholeheartedly condemned the 
mass murder of European Jews perpetrated by the Nazis, there is just no evidence to show that this was in 
any way central to his thinking.” (Rodden, John (Edited by), The Cambridge Companion to George Orwell, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 123) 
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is exerted for the sake of  power. As Arendt will later claim, terror is an end in itself. 
Orwell’s vision can be boiled down to what could be called the four ignoble 
truths of totalitarianism. Primo, power is not a means but an end; secundo, 
power is collective; it is power over human beings; tertio, power seeks total 
control of the mind in order to totally control matter; quarto, power necessarily 
consists in the capacity to inflict suffering and, ultimately, to torture.19 As 
Huxley could have said: the habeas corpus is replaced by an habeas mentem…20 
In sum, Orwell offers a vision that updates Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651) with 
Sade’s Cent Vingt Journées de Sodome (1785). By doing so, he makes transparent the 
inherent (or nascent) psychopathy of the power seeker.  
2.2.2. Concentration camps 
Three sources would need to be tracked to understand how Orwell’s own 
borderline experiences have carved this vision. First, his life as a tramp in the 
years 1928–1931 (described in Down and Out in Paris and London, 1933). Second, 
his participation in the Spanish Civil War in 1936–1937 (that is accounted for in 
Homage to Catalonia, 1938). Third, his understanding of the concentrational logic, 
that lies at the root of the historical expression of Nazi totalitarianism. Since the 
present paper basically deals with the contrast between Brave New World and 
Nineteen Eighty-Four, it seems adequate to focus only on the third issue.  
Some historical reminder is however needed. First, the Gulag system (1930–
1960) does not belong to the practice of concentration per se : quite 
unfortunately, Arendt and many other Western scholars were obviously not 
interested in introducing a sharp distinguo between the incriminated States.21 
Second, concentration camps per se were created during the Ten Years' War 
with Cuba (1868–1878). Animated with a “let rot and die” policy, they were 
soon used during the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902) and the Philippine-
 
19 George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four, pp. 301 sq. Cf. “Will you please remember, throughout our 
conversation, that I have it in my power to inﬂict pain on you at any moment and to whatever degree I 
choose? If you tell me any lies, or attempt to prevaricate in any way, or even fall below your usual level of 
intelligence, you will cry out with pain, instantly. Do you understand that?’” (p. 281) See my Whitehead’s 
Pancreativism. Jamesian Applications, Frankfurt / Paris, ontos verlag, 2011.  
20 Aldous Huxley, Brave New World Revisited [1958], New York, Harper & Row, 2006, p. 114. 
21 See, e.g., Geoffrey Roberts, Stalin’s Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953, New Haven & 
London, Yale University Press, 2006; Domenico Losurdo, Stalin, Storia e critica di una leggenda nera, Milano, 
Carocci, 2008. 
 MICHEL WEBER 175 
American War (1899–1902).22 What happened in Nazi Germany was in 
continuity with these “contingency plans:” the concentration camps were 
created in 1933 (i.e., in the aftermath of the Reichstag arson, an event that is 
called in naval warfare a false flag operation) to house mainly communists and 
trade unionists, but also Gypsies, petty criminals, Jehovah's Witnesses, 
freemasons and homosexuals. Jews were deported only if they did belong to 
one of these categories. The policy had changed however: it was no longer a 
matter of gathering individuals and to let them die because of poor hygiene, 
malnourishment and ill-treatment—but of working the inmates to death, while 
terrorizing and torturing them in the process. After the Anschluss (1938), this 
policy specifically targeted the Jews because of their Jewishness. When the 
Stalingrad moment came (1942), quick extermination became the goal. 
Bruno Bettelheim was perhaps the first to publish an account of the life in 
the camps. The purpose the concentration camps, he claimed, was fourfold: “to 
break the prisoners as individuals and to change them into docile masses,” “to 
spread terror among the rest of the population,” “to provide the Gestapo 
members with a training ground,” and to create “an experimental laboratory” 
using human subjects. 23 As a result, prisoners would behave aggressively 
towards the so-called “unfit” prisoners, arrange their own clothing to imitate 
the guards’ uniforms, reject the idea of intervention by foreign powers aimed at 
liberating them (before the outbreak of World War II), and even defend some 
elements of Nazi ideology. 
Bettelheim was followed by Leo Löwenthal, who brought to the fore 
additional elements and insights.24 First, he explicitly linked fascist terror with 
“the pattern of modern economy”25 (a thesis anticipated by Mumford26). 
Second, he showed that the terror enforced in camps produced the atomization 
 
22 They were factually anticipated during the Indian wars (e.g., the Cherokee removal, 1836–1839). 
23 Bruno Bettelheim, “Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations,” Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, 38, 1943, pp. 417-452, here pp. 418-419. 
24 Leo Löwenthal, “Terror's Atomization of Man,” Commentary 1, 1945/1946, pp. 1-8.  
25 “I believe that [the fascist terror] is deeply rooted in the trends of modern civilization, and especially in 
the pattern of modern economy.” (p. 1) According to the axioms of neoliberalism—that are likely to have 
been written by Frank H. Knight (1885–1972)—pure and perfect competition mainly requires atomicity of 
supply and demand (i.e., infinite buyers and sellers), homogenous products, market transparency (i.e., 
perfect information), zero entry and exit barriers and perfect factor mobility. 
26 Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization, New York, Harcourt Brace and Company, 1934. 
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of the individual, who lived independently of his/her fellow human beings.27 
Third, he claimed that the terror furthermore dissociated the individual, who 
lived in a state of stupor, in a moral coma.28 
Basically the same conclusions were also reached by Viktor Frankl, Virgil 
Gheorghiu, Victor Klemperer, and Hannah Arendt after the epoch-machend 
Eichmann trial of 1961.29 
The logic of torture is clearly a logic of power. It is never a matter of 
retrieving information. In so far as data mining is concerned, it seeks to 
obliterate memories, to destroy evidence and to dispose of the witness. 
Sometimes implanting new (i.e., fake, memories is also sought. It is always a 
matter of ruining the individual, of his/her own identity, culture, and social 
tissue. Only absent-minded lay persons or ranting ideologues can believe that 
torture is justified by so-called asymmetrical threats. Additionally, if the purely 
pragmatic question of the reliability of data obtained during torture is raised, 
the answer is simply zero.30 
3. THE TECHNOLOGICAL CHIASMA 
In conclusion, technique lato sensu and technoscience stricto sensu are put at work 
completely differently in Brave New World and Nineteen Eighty-Four. In both cases, 
 
27 “Essentially, the modern system of terror amounts to the atomization of the individual. We shudder at 
the tortures inflicted on the physical bodies of men; we should be no less appalled by its menace to the 
spirit of man. […] The individual under terrorist conditions is never alone and always alone. He becomes 
numb and rigid not only in relation to his neighbor but also in relation to himself; fear robs him of the 
power of spontaneous emotional or mental reaction. Thinking becomes a stupid crime; it endangers his 
life. The inevitable consequence is that stupidity spreads as a contagious disease among the terrorized 
population. Human beings live in a state of stupor, in a moral coma.” (p. 2) To specify this one should 
revisit the physiology of predation, that happens to throw light on the mechanism of (post-)traumatic 
stress: the keys are hyperarousal, constriction, fight/flight or freezing/dissociation, release/collapsus or 
helplessness, re-enactment… 
28 “In a terrorist society, in which everything is most carefully planned, the plan for the individual is—to 
have none; to become and to remain a mere object, a bundle of conditioned reflexes which amply 
respond to a series of manipulated and calculated shocks. […] In a system that reduces life to a chain of 
disconnected reactions to shock, personal communication tends to lose all meaning […].” (p. 3) 
29 Viktor Frankl, Trotzdem Ja Zum Leben Sagen: Ein Psychologe erlebt das Konzentrationslager, Wien, Deuticke, 1946; 
Virgil Gheorghiu, Twenty-fifth hour, op. cit., 1949; Victor Klemperer, LTI-Lingua Tertii Imperii: Notizbuch 
eines Philologen, Reclam Verlag Leipzig, 1947; Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem. A Report on the 
Banality of Evil [1963]. Revised and enlarged edition, Hardmondsworth, Penguin Books Ltd, 1977. 
30 Cf., e.g., Françoise Sironi, Bourreaux et victimes : Psychologie de la torture, Paris, Odile Jacob, 1999. 
 MICHEL WEBER 177 
the narrative relies heavily upon the Malthusian threat and the requirement of 
social stabilization while the unavoidability of industrialism, productivism, 
materialism, standardization (overorganization), and oil-guzzling militarism is 
accepted at face value.  
Amongst the significant variations we have the following: the World State 
secures peace and abundance, whereas the Inner Party purposely maintains a 
state of war, scarcity and morbid austerity. The former exploits a shame culture 
in which you have to conceal your trespassings from the community’s sight; the 
latter imposes a guilt culture that involves full confession to a priest of power. 
Accordingly, the penalty is exile or torture.  
The bottom contrast is, as claimed supra, the difference between the soft, so 
to speak benevolent, totalitarianism of Brave New World and the harsh, clearly 
malevolent one, of Nineteen Eighty-Four. It is reflected in the specificity of the 
infantilization involved: on the one hand, denizens are treated liked spoiled 
brats expected to (unconsciously) love their servitude; on the other hand, they 
are akin to terrorized children who are asked to hate their servitude in a 
borderline manner.  
We have claimed that the young Huxley shows clear signs of technophilia 
whereas Orwell is uncompromisingly pessimistic in that regard. Of tremendous 
importance is the fact that Huxley never understood Orwell’s meaning and significance. 
The letter Huxley wrote to his fellow novelist after reading Nineteen Eighty-Four 
leaves no doubt about this: 
The philosophy of the ruling minority in Nineteen Eighty-Four is a sadism which has 
been carried to its logical conclusion by going beyond sex and denying it. 
Whether in actual fact the policy of the boot-on-the-face can go on indefinitely 
seems doubtful. My own belief is that the ruling oligarchy will find less arduous 
and wasteful ways of governing and of satisfying its lust for power, and these ways 
will resemble those which I described in Brave New World. […] Within the next 
generation I believe that the world's rulers will discover that infant conditioning 
and narco-hypnosis are more efficient, as instruments of government, than clubs 
and prisons, and that the lust for power can be just as completely satisfied by 
suggesting people into loving their servitude as by flogging and kicking them into 
obedience. In other words, I feel that the nightmare of Nineteen Eighty-Four is 
destined to modulate into the nightmare of a world having more resemblance to 
that which I imagined in Brave New World. The change will be brought about as 
a result of a felt need for increased efficiency. Meanwhile, of course, there may be 
a large scale biological and atomic war—in which case we shall have nightmares 
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of other and scarcely imaginable kinds.31 
There was obviously something in Huxley’s education and life experience 
that prevented him from grasping Orwell’s message. There are things, we are 
told, that a gentleman would not contemplate doing. Needless to say that his 
intelligence and wide culture cannot account for such a blunder. 
By means of conclusion, it is interesting to question the likeliness of a late 
shift in Huxley’s appraisal of the vices and virtues of technique. Brave New World 
Revisited (1958) showed a clear concern for the totalitarian potential of 
technoscience, but Huxley still claimed that a scientific enslavement is better—
say more comfortable—than the old-fashioned one! The West is after all the 
heir of the enlightenment. Here's a statement he made in 1961 at San 
Francisco’s California Medical School:  
There will be, in the next generation or so, a pharmacological method of making 
people love their servitude, and producing dictatorship without tears, so to speak, 
producing a kind of painless concentration camp for entire societies, so that 
people will in fact have their liberties taken away from them, but will rather enjoy 
it, because they will be distracted from any desire to rebel by propaganda or 
brainwashing, or brainwashing enhanced by pharmacological methods. And this 
seems to be the final revolution. 
Likewise in 1962:  
It seems to me that the nature of the ultimate revolution with which we are now 
faced is precisely this, that we are in process of developing a whole series of 
techniques which will enable the controlling oligarchy, who have always existed 
and presumably always will exist, to get people actually to love their servitude. 
This seems to me the ultimate malevolent revolution… This is a problem which 
has interested me for many years and about which I wrote, 30 years ago, a fable 
Brave New World which is essentially the account of a society making use of all the 
devices at that time available and some of the devices which I imagined to be 
possible, making use of them in order to, first of all, to standardize the 
population, to iron out inconvenient human differences, to create, so to say, mass 
produced models of human beings arranged in some kind of a scientific caste 
system. Since then I have continued to be extremely interested in this problem 
and I have noticed with increasing dismay that a number of the predictions 
which were purely fantastic when I made them 30 years ago have come true or 
 
31 Letter to George Orwell, 21 October, 1949, in Huxley, Brave New World Revisited, op. cit., “P.S.” section, 
p. 8 sq. 
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seem in process of coming true. A number of techniques about which I talked 
seem to be here already, and that there seems to be a general movement in the 
direction of this kind of ultimate revolution, this method of control by which 
people can be made to enjoy a state of affairs which by any decent standard they 
ought not to enjoy. I mean the enjoyment of servitude.32 
The late Huxley seems thus keen to brush away some of the ambiguities of 
Brave New World, that navigated between disenchanted narrative knots factually 
arguing for the political use of technoscience and passages suggesting that life 
would lose its meaning in such a framework. It does not seem wise to privilege 
the heuristical thesis of a purely satirical work. 
If we peruse the categories used earlier to contrast Brave New World and 
Nineteen Eighty-Four in order to screen Island (1962), we obtain the following. 
Interestingly enough, Island also accepts the Malthusian threat and the 
requirement of social stabilization: all three political systems are instances of 
“clockwork societies.” But the status of technoscience and its contribution are 
here radically different: for one thing, technoscience is not piloted anymore by 
a blend of politics that is reminiscent of the “market economy,” but by 
Buddhist spirituality; for another, it fosters an organic, non-dualistic, social 
fabric instead of a materialistic, productivistic one. Furthermore, the insular 
kingdom—that has no army—is also characterised by peace and abundance, 
but the comparison with Brave New World stops here: a constitutional monarchy 
replaces the benevolent totalitarianism whereas individual growth and 
solidarity replace infantilization and unconscious servitude.  
We could discuss other relevant contrasts such as the Moksha/Soma one, 
that exemplifies the difference between a natural entheogenic medicine 
enhancing awareness and a synthetic drug that induces total obliteration. Or 
the difference between hypnosis qua natural healing process and social 
engineering mated with hypnopaedia, between true love and promiscuous sex, 
initiation and consumption, meaningful life and meaningless pleasure… There 
is no need to clarify all interpretational issues in the context of the present 
argument. Suffice it to say that the synergy Island depicts between 
technoscience and spirituality corresponds, mutatis mutandis, to the 
 
32 “The Ultimate Revolution,” March 20, 1962 Berkeley Language Center—Speech Archive SA 0269 cf., 
e.g.: http://pulsemedia.org/2009/02/02/aldous-huxley-the-ultimate-revolution/.  
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Whiteheadian interpretation of postmodern science that calls for a society 
rooted both in science and in Christian religiosity. (Sadly enough, 
Whiteheadians have not yet realized this.)33 
In conclusion, there is a long-lasting technophilia in Huxley that is 
completely foreign to Orwell’s vision. As a matter of fact, Huxley’s dystopia 
does provide a plausible picture of our future (the work on ectogenesis is only 
starting) while recent scientific advances (like cellular phones, internet, 
geolocalization and RFID technology34) make a Big Brother state perhaps more 
likely in the immediate future. One should certainly not forget that the global 
systemic crisis is only starting and will have devastating effects on all aspects of 
our live.35 
There is no need however to work out the odds because the respective 
arguments hold actually at two different levels. In fine, Huxley and Orwell 
provide indeed antagonistic perspectives on the stakes of power: Huxley sees 
the exercise of power as purely technocratic and, volens nolens, happily envisions 
 
33 See Griffin’s constructive postmodernism, e.g. in his The Reenchantment of Science. Postmodern Proposals, 
Albany, New York, State University of New York Press, 1988. Cf. my Whitehead’s Pancreativism. Jamesian 
Applications, op. cit., § 8.2.3. 
34 To simplify, there are basically two types of RFID tags: passive RFID tags, which have no built-in 
power source and require an external electromagnetic field to initiate a signal transmission; and active 
RFID tags, which contain a battery and can transmit signals once an external source (“Interrogator”) has 
been successfully identified. Some are “read-only” chips, other can be modified after implantation. In 
order to keep the argument tight, the following schematization of the technical possibilities could be 
proposed: to peruse, on the one hand, passive nanochips that can be widely used to tag commodities; on 
the other, active microchips that are developed in order to help specialized institutions to cope with some 
animal or some human beings. The thesis would be that we are about to enter bigmotherhood and that, 
from there, Big Brother will arise. Please note that the impending merging of bio and nano technologies 
with IT offers actually a far gloomier picture than the one I sketch here, but it is also more difficult to 
envision pragmatically in the context of this short essay. Some pioneering work has been done by a 
French group—Pièces et Main d’œuvre—, e.g. in Rfid: la Police Totale—Puces Intelligentes et Mouchardage 
Electronique, Paris, Éditions de L'Échappée, 2008. 
35 The expression “global systemic crisis” covers two main dimensions: on the one hand, the fact that all 
fields of human activity are now in a critical state and, on the other, the fact that all these dysfunctions are 
linked. The dematerialization of the economy fostered a global financial speculation; peak oil means the 
end of cheap energy and of all the petrol-derivative; the collapse of biosphere involves the exhaustion of 
vital ressources (minerals, water…), but also climat change (as it is linked with pollution), and the 6th mass 
extinction; social unrest (riots, famine, pandemies) are expected since the political vacuum is 
flabbergasting; wars and neocolonialism are already widespread while the demographic racing (social 
Darwinism) remains threatening. 
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the complete fulfilment of La Boétie’s nightmare. For his part, Orwell uncovers 
the very dynamics of power and demonstrates that, whatever the technological 
sophistication, the basics of politics (“101”) will remain the same (“Room 101”). 
The exercise of power involves the capacity to impose suffering on human 
beings. There is even no need of a very sophisticated argument to establish this: 
only the suffering of the subordinate demonstrates the power of the superior 
(happiness can have various sources) and only torture secures that the suffering 
is real (more benign forms of torment allow the subordinate to pretend that s/he 
is not hurt).  
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